Commit graph

5 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Francisco Solla
cd4698571a fix(e2e): first() em asserts com duplicação transitória de RSC pending (flake pré-existente, base reproduz) 2026-08-09 04:37:27 -03:00
Francisco Solla
97dd13443e test(campaign): endurece locators de texto contra duplicata transitória de hidratação
Mesmo padrão já pinado em 'Otimista: 5.000': o slot server-composed
renderiza duas cópias por um instante durante a hidratação — .nth(0)
nas asserções de perfil (webauthn) e dossiê (municípios). Não relacionado
ao B176; observado deterministicamente no servidor de produção local.
2026-08-09 03:19:54 -03:00
Cursor Agent
5c59793e4c test(miss-53): gate WebAuthn ceremonies on authenticator readiness
The app's biometrics probe is one-shot per island mount: when
isUserVerifyingPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable() resolves before the CDP
virtual authenticator answers, the enrollment form / biometric button
never mount and no wait flips them (prod-build CI flake). New
expectCampaignBiometricsReady(page) polls the platform answer BEFORE the
surface whose island probes it; adopted at both ceremony entries in
campaignWebAuthn (verified green locally). Conventions pin:
e2eNavigationConventions fails the build when a virtual-authenticator
spec skips the readiness gate.
2026-07-31 20:57:18 -03:00
Francisco Ignácio Fontoura Solla
4806c417c8 Engineering Pass 3: consolidate patterns and lock them with guards.
Fold duplicated campanha access, loaders, list/filter/form shells, and scripts into shared modules; reorganize utilities by domain; stabilize e2e; and document prevention-first audit workflow so the same smells cannot creep back in.
2026-07-29 06:11:29 -03:00
Francisco Ignácio Fontoura Solla
763f64080a Deliver B40: biometric login for /campanha.
WebAuthn platform passkeys: opt-in enrollment after a password login, a
password-less sign-in that mints the same 14-day campaign-token, and
revocation from the profile. The session is minted through Payload's public
pieces (checkLoginPermission, addSessionToUser, getFieldsToSign, jwtSign)
inside a transaction with an advisory lock, so a passkey login neither
bypasses a lockout nor evicts the account's other sessions. The rpID is
derived from NEXT_PUBLIC_SITE_URL and resolves to null when the request host
disagrees, so previews never offer a ceremony the browser would refuse.
2026-07-28 10:59:23 -03:00