# Public site domain (AGENTS layer — load when touching `(frontend)`) ## Photo album (`/fotos`) — C233 The public album over the private archive (`archivePhoto`, C231/C232): **only `publicationStatus: 'approved'` photos** are read (`getApprovedArchivePhotoItems`, `src/utilities/archivePhotos/archivePhotoReads.ts`), cached under the collection listing tag `archivePhotos` and busted by the collection's `afterChange`/`afterDelete` — an `approved→removed` edit pulls the photo and its media down **without a deploy**. The route canonicalizes to `/fotos`; the single-value facets are `data` (day, `YYYY-MM-DD`), `municipio` (catalog slug), `atividade` (an `ARCHIVE_PHOTO_SCENES` value), `pessoa` (slug of a curated `faceFigure`, recognized by the facial layer — C244; the text `catalog.people` no longer governs it) plus `q`/`pagina`; `?foto=` is the non-canonical overlay and `/fotos/` keeps 404ing (no page per photo). Media goes through the same-origin proxy `/fotos//midia` (`?tamanho=grade` resizes on the fly, `?download=1` names `jorge-solla-foto-.`, `X-Robots-Tag: noindex`); the municipality name/slug are snapshotted on the row (`municipalityName`/`municipalitySlug`) because the `municipality` collection is campaign-only. The album global `photoAlbum` holds the two product knobs: `published` (kill switch — **only `false` closes**; an absent row means the schema default `true`) and `removalChannelUrl` (the visible "é você nesta foto? peça a remoção" channel, never invented in code). Publishing the album or approving a photo **requires a valid channel** (fail-closed guard in the global and in the collection); the album has no `loading.tsx` on purpose — a Suspense boundary would turn the closed album's `notFound()` into a `200`. The "Fotos" link in `CampaignFooter` is permanent (the album renders its own honest empty state), and the home gallery (`CampaignPhotoSection`) reads the same approved list. ## Selfie search (`/fotos/encontre`) — C234/C242 The visitor's photo never leaves their device: the browser runs the face-api nets locally (models served same-origin from `/fotos/modelos`, copied by `scripts/copy-face-vision-assets.mjs` in prebuild/predev/Docker) and posts only the 128-float descriptor to `POST /api/fotos/selfie` (`{ vector, intent: 'search' | 'leave-index' }`, JSON ≤4 KB, same-origin, rate-limited 20/10 min per hashed IP with its own key namespace). The answer is a list of **approved** photos (`{ ok, found, photos }`), never a score, a percentage or a third-party name — the view model (`src/lib/faceSearch.ts` `toFaceSearchPhotoView`) has no such fields by shape. Recusals: 400 body, 403 origin, 429 throttle, 404 when `photoAlbum.published === false` or `selfieSearchEnabled !== true`, 503 when either Consent is missing. Since C243 the public homepage carries a conditional discovery section (`SelfieSearchHomeSection`) that only presents and links — no capture/engine there. **The index is scope B (owner decision, 2026-10-01, supersedes the A/C gate of PR #1370): an anonymous descriptor index of the approved archive, so ANY visitor can find themselves.** The batch (`pnpm faces:index --apply|--verify`, maintenance service with the C231/C232 write guards) downloads each approved photo, detects faces with the same engine and persists identity-free rows in `archivePhotoFace` (photo + 128-float vector + model); `archivePhoto.faces.checkedKey` stores only the model, so a model change marks everything stale. There is no enrollment and no per-person consent: the `Consent` rows are the visitor's query consent and the public index notice. The rows die with the public status — the collection hooks purge them when a photo stops being `approved` or is deleted (plus the FK `ON DELETE CASCADE`) — and the answer always intersects with the C233 approved read. The CLI engine (`scripts/lib/faceEngine.mjs`) loads the same nets from `node_modules`. **The curated public-figure layer (C244).** The album's `pessoa` facet and its "Quem aparece" line list ONLY the curated public figures of the mandate catalog, as recognized by the facial index — never third parties, never a score. The catalog is the admin-only `faceFigure` collection (name, `slug` = `?pessoa` value, `active`, 1–8 curated reference descriptors enrolled by `pnpm faces:enroll-figure`; the initial rows by `pnpm seed:face-figures`). `faceFigureReads` matches the references against the SAME anonymous index at read time (no materialized link, no reprocess), cached under the album's `archivePhotos` tag: figure edits/deletes, photo lifecycle purges and the opt-out bust it, and the batch/enrollment CLIs go through the runbook's `POST /api/revalidate?tag=archivePhotos`. The layer **fails closed on the `busca-selfie-indice` notice Consent** (checked outside the cache: absent row → no names), and the C244 notice text declares the curated filter explicitly. `catalog.people` remains ficha/Central content and still feeds the `q` haystack, but it does not create the facet or the "Quem aparece" line. Both sides are **fail-closed**: `selfieSearchEnabled` defaults to `false`; the two Consent keys (`busca-selfie-fotos` query consent, `busca-selfie-indice` public index notice, in `src/lib/campaignConsentKeys.ts`) are provisioned by `pnpm seed:face-consents` from the texts versioned in `scripts/lib/faceConsentTexts.mjs` — without both admin rows the page renders the closed state and the API refuses. Opt-out is self-service ("Minha presença" → face match deletes the matching descriptors, so the face stops answering); photo takedown keeps using `photoAlbum.removalChannelUrl`. Opening the surface also requires approving the archive (`pnpm archive:publish`, bulk `draft → approved`, never touching `removed`). E2E builds stub the engine with `NEXT_PUBLIC_FACE_SEARCH_STUB=1` (`window.__faceSearchStub`); the real engine is exercised by the CLI canary and manually. Runbook: `docs/ops/teqo-1313-deploy.md` §C242. ## Home Plenária section (S44) The campaign home carries a section for the Plenária da Vitória right after the hero. It is driven by **one fixed share link** (`SHARE_LINK_HOME_SECTION_SLUG = 'plenaria-vitoria'`, `src/lib/shareLinkHomeSection.ts`) — no CMS field, no migration: the link itself remains the owner of the title, description, image, date and destination pool. `loadShareLinkHomeSection` (`src/utilities/shareLinkReads.ts`) reads it under the same cached `shareLinks` tag as the announcement page (unpublish pulls the section without a deploy) and fails closed: no published link, no valid `startsAt`, or `now >= endsAt` (else `startsAt` + 2h) → the section is absent from the HTML. While the window is open the client island (`ShareLinkHomeSection`) renders the invitation — image + the S29 agenda, **never an entry button**; once a destination is on air the poll (shared hook `useShareLinkLiveTarget`, activation-only, 30s, paused on hidden tabs) swaps the image for the official `youtube-nocookie` player (video id derived from the link's pre-registered YouTube destination) and the entry CTA takes the agenda's place, always pointing to `/plenaria-vitoria` (never the raw Meet/YouTube URL) with the label by host (`Entrar na plenária` on Meet, `Assistir no YouTube` on YouTube). The island also hides itself at the exact window close, covering open tabs over the ISR-stale HTML. No data collection, no Consent, no PII. ## Posts & Tags (news / publications) The public news/publications system is backed by two collections (both in the `Publicações` admin group) plus the helpers in `src/utilities/posts.ts`. - **`post`** (`src/collections/Post.ts`) — fields: `title`, `slug` (unique, indexed, auto-slugified from `title` when left empty), `type` (select enum `noticia|campanha|artigo|evento`), `category` (required single relationship → `tag`), `tags` (`hasMany` relationship → `tag`), `subtitle`, `coverImage` (upload → `media`), `publishedDate`, `body` (richText). Has drafts/versions (`schedulePublish`, `maxPerDoc: 5`). - **`tag`** (`src/collections/Tag.ts`) — fields: `name`, `slug` (unique, indexed, auto-slugified from `name`), and `hidden` (checkbox, admin label "Esconder", default `false`). Tags are the shared taxonomy for both `post.category` and `post.tags`. **Tags are a taxonomy, not a person record.** The `Contact` convention applies to _people_; `tag` is publication metadata (categories + a visibility control flag), so post/tag relations do not touch `Contact`. Don't fold taxonomy into `Contact` or vice-versa. **Electoral visibility control (`hidden` + fail-closed `isPostVisible`).** Marking a tag `hidden` hides every post that references it — as `category` or in `tags` — with a single toggle. This exists so campaign / pre-candidacy content (tagged `eleitoral`) can be pulled from the public site during the electoral period. `isPostVisible(post)` (`src/utilities/posts.ts`) returns true only when the post is `published` AND none of its related tags (`category` + `tags`) is `hidden`. It **fails closed**: an unpopulated relation (a bare numeric id) is treated as hiding, so callers must fetch with `depth >= 1`. Every public read filters through `getVisiblePosts()`, which applies this predicate to the cached published list. **URLs and Portuguese SEO values.** The canonical article path is `/[type]/[category]/[slug]` (e.g. `/noticia/saude/`), with `/[type]` and `/[type]/[category]` listing routes and the home "Últimas notícias" list. The `type` enum values (`noticia|campanha|artigo|evento`) and tag/category slugs (`saude`, `eleitoral`, …) are deliberately Portuguese for SEO and are **data, not identifiers** — never translate them (see the naming-conventions bullet above). The route folders are `[type]/[category]/[slug]` (English param keys); the article route redirects any stale/mismatched URL to the canonical path derived from the post's _current_ `type` + category slug. Article pages emit JSON-LD (`Article`) and Open Graph metadata. **Caching (mixed ISR, `posts` tag).** Public reads go through the `unstable_cache` wrappers in `src/utilities/posts.ts` (`getCachedPublishedPosts`, `getCachedPostBySlug`), all tagged `posts`. The routes set `export const dynamicParams = true` and build `generateStaticParams` from `getVisiblePosts()`: known paths are statically generated, unknown ones render on demand, and everything stays cached until the `posts` tag is busted. `revalidatePostsListing()` (`src/utilities/documents.ts`) is `revalidateTag('posts')` (the listing tag is `` `${collection}s` `` → `posts`), so one call busts the home page, every listing route, and every article route at once. **Self-revalidation on admin edits.** Both collections have an `afterChange` hook. `post` busts its own document tag + the `posts` listing on every publish/update (skipping only the initial draft that the admin create view generates during render). `tag` is broader: on change it re-reads every post referencing that tag (as `category` or in `tags`, passing `req` for transaction safety) and revalidates each one plus the listing — so flipping `hidden` is reflected on the site immediately. **Seeding news content (`pnpm db:seed:posts`).** `scripts/seed-posts.mjs` (loaded via `scripts/seed-loader.mjs`) fetches ~43 articles live from jorgesolla.com.br (WordPress REST API, with an HTML-crawl fallback), imports them as `type: 'noticia'` published posts, converts the WP HTML body to Payload Lexical, and uploads cover images through the configured media storage (Garage S3 when the `S3_*` envs are set — the adapter overwrites the deterministic `.` key natively, no pre-delete needed; local disk otherwise). The taxonomy (categories + the `eleitoral` control tag, and the per-slug classification) is hardcoded in the script; it reads/writes the `hidden` flag. It is **idempotent by slug** (existing posts are skipped; tags/media are reused by slug/filename) and reuses the same non-local `DATABASE_URL` guard as `pnpm dev` (override only with `ALLOW_REMOTE_DB=true`). `pnpm db:seed:posts --dry-run` is the plan-only pre-flight (fetches, resolves covers, reports what WOULD be created — no writes). **Since OPS60, sync with the `S3_*` envs set also requires explicit bucket-write intent: `SEED_MEDIA_CONFIRM=1`** (fail-closed, same `isTruthyEnv` pattern as `MEDIA_RECOVER_CONFIRM`; without it the sync refuses with exit 1 before any write — the `S3_*` envs alone must never arm a bucket write, since a worktree with a prod-credentials copy running sync against a local DB would write covers to the prod bucket). `--dry-run` stays flag-free. The OPS58 runbook documents the production sync (post-merge, homeserver, stack env, dry-run → sync → bust `posts` cache → verify) — copy it for future syncs (see `docs/plans/ops58-sincronizar-posts-prod-impl.md`). ### Revalidating after a manual/direct DB change Admin edits made through the deployed app self-revalidate via the `afterChange` hooks above. But any write that does **not** go through the deployed Payload runtime — direct SQL, `pnpm db:seed:posts`, a DB restore / `db:pull` — will **not** bust production's frozen `posts` cache. (Even when such a write triggers the hook, its `revalidateTag('posts')` runs in that CLI/local process and cannot touch the deployed server's cache.) The pages keep serving stale content until the tag is busted. Bust it with the secured endpoint (`src/app/(frontend)/api/revalidate/route.ts`): ```bash # News (`posts` tag — default) curl -X POST "https:///api/revalidate" \ -H "x-revalidate-secret: $REVALIDATE_SECRET" # Privacy policy global after Onda 0 migration/seed (`global_privacy-policy`) curl -X POST "https:///api/revalidate?tag=global_privacy-policy" \ -H "x-revalidate-secret: $REVALIDATE_SECRET" ``` - **Auth:** send the secret via `x-revalidate-secret` or `Authorization: Bearer `; it is compared to `REVALIDATE_SECRET` with a constant-time check. - `REVALIDATE_SECRET` must be set in the **production** env (and in your local env if you want to test the endpoint). It is documented in `.env.example`. - **Tag:** optional `?tag=` query or JSON body `{ "tag": "..." }` (query wins). Allowlist: `posts` (default), `global_privacy-policy`, `election-tse` (bust after re-running `pnpm db:seed:tse` so the cached elections-tab reads refresh), `municipality-catalog` (bust after a migration/seed that adds or renames a município so chip indexes and `unstable_cache` loaders refresh), `social-feed` (bust after a direct-DB write to the `social-feed-settings` global — e.g. an admin-less seed of the YouTube/Instagram feed config; admin edits self-revalidate), `archivePhotos` (bust after a direct-DB write to `archivePhoto` rows — admin edits self-revalidate via the collection hook; the public album `/fotos` caches under it). Unknown tag → `400`. - **Instagram sync status (S11):** the global's `instagramSyncStatus` jsonb (hidden) is written by the render path, by `afterChange` (re-sync only when IG credentials changed), and by the admin button `POST /api/social-feed/sync` (admin session via `payload.auth` + same-origin guard); the `InstagramSyncStatusPanel` ui field renders it. Runbook de credenciais: `docs/ops/instagram-feed-token-runbook.md`. - **Responses:** `200 { revalidated: true, tag: '...' }` on success; `401` if the secret is missing/wrong; `500` if `REVALIDATE_SECRET` is not configured on the server. - This POST is the required last step of the post-seed / direct-DB-change runbook.