#!/usr/bin/env node /** * Portable write guard (repo hooks.json, preToolUse on Write/Edit). * * Denies agent writes to local env files (`.env`, `.env.local`, `.env.test`): * they carry DATABASE_URLs and secrets, and the parallel-ops contract says * agents never repoint databases (stage/prod URLs live only in CI secrets and * human-run scripts). Humans editing by hand are unaffected — this only gates * tool calls. * * Contract (same as the impeccable hook): never break a turn accidentally — * malformed input or internal errors allow the tool and exit 0. */ const DENY_PATTERN = /(^|\/)\.env(\.local|\.test|\.production)?$/ let input = '' process.stdin.on('data', (chunk) => (input += chunk)) process.stdin.on('end', () => { try { const payload = JSON.parse(input) const filePath = payload?.tool_input?.file_path ?? payload?.tool_input?.path ?? '' if (typeof filePath === 'string' && DENY_PATTERN.test(filePath)) { process.stdout.write( JSON.stringify({ decision: 'deny', reason: 'Agentes não editam arquivos .env* (contrato agentic ops: nunca repontar DATABASE_URL; stage/prod só em secrets de CI e scripts humanos).', }), ) process.exit(0) } } catch { // malformed input → allow } process.exit(0) })