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The rebase brought a convention guard that refuses a route.ts exporting POST outside campaignJsonMutationRoute, and it named all four WebAuthn routes. They now come from the shell, so the same-origin check is structural rather than copied, and postJson delegates to postCampaignJson — keeping only what the ceremonies add on top: the envelope's discriminant decides instead of the status, and a non-JSON response reads as one sentence while a network failure still propagates untouched. The two *-options routes have no body, hence campaignWebAuthnNoBodySchema.
74 lines
2.6 KiB
TypeScript
74 lines
2.6 KiB
TypeScript
import type { AuthenticationResponseJSON, RegistrationResponseJSON } from '@simplewebauthn/browser'
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import { z } from 'zod'
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import { CAMPAIGN_WEBAUTHN_DEVICE_LABEL_MAX_LENGTH } from '@/lib/campaignWebAuthn'
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import { positiveRelationshipId } from '@/lib/schemas/primitives'
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/**
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* Envelope checks only. The credential's cryptographic content is verified by
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* `@simplewebauthn/server` against the stored challenge, the relying party and
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* the enrolled public key, so re-describing every base64url field here would
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* duplicate that authority. This layer exists to reject a body that is not a
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* credential of the expected ceremony before it reaches the verifier.
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*
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* The final cast is the one place it happens: zod proves the envelope, and the
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* union members of `clientExtensionResults` / `authenticatorAttachment` are
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* browser-owned enums that only the verifier reads.
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*/
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const credentialEnvelope = <Credential>(
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response: z.ZodType<Record<string, unknown>>,
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): z.ZodType<Credential, unknown> =>
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z
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.looseObject({
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id: z.string().min(1),
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rawId: z.string().min(1),
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type: z.literal('public-key'),
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clientExtensionResults: z.looseObject({}),
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response,
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})
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.transform((value) => value as unknown as Credential)
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const registrationCredential = credentialEnvelope<RegistrationResponseJSON>(
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z.looseObject({
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clientDataJSON: z.string().min(1),
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attestationObject: z.string().min(1),
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}),
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)
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const authenticationCredential = credentialEnvelope<AuthenticationResponseJSON>(
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z.looseObject({
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clientDataJSON: z.string().min(1),
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authenticatorData: z.string().min(1),
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signature: z.string().min(1),
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}),
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)
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const campaignPasskeyDeviceLabel = z
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.string()
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.trim()
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.min(1, 'Dê um nome a este aparelho.')
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.max(CAMPAIGN_WEBAUTHN_DEVICE_LABEL_MAX_LENGTH)
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export const campaignWebAuthnRegisterSchema = z.object({
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deviceLabel: campaignPasskeyDeviceLabel,
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credential: registrationCredential,
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})
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export const campaignWebAuthnLoginSchema = z.object({
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credential: authenticationCredential,
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})
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export const campaignPasskeyRemoveSchema = z.object({
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passkeyId: positiveRelationshipId,
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})
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/**
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* The two `*-options` routes have nothing to validate: what ceremony to open is
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* decided by the session, or by nothing at all in the anonymous case. They still
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* go through `campaignJsonMutationRoute` — the same-origin check is the point of
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* that shell — and it always parses a body, so the client posts `{}` and this is
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* what "no input" looks like at the boundary.
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*/
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export const campaignWebAuthnNoBodySchema = z.unknown()
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export type CampaignPasskeyRemoveInput = z.infer<typeof campaignPasskeyRemoveSchema>
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