WebAuthn platform passkeys: opt-in enrollment after a password login, a password-less sign-in that mints the same 14-day campaign-token, and revocation from the profile. The session is minted through Payload's public pieces (checkLoginPermission, addSessionToUser, getFieldsToSign, jwtSign) inside a transaction with an advisory lock, so a passkey login neither bypasses a lockout nor evicts the account's other sessions. The rpID is derived from NEXT_PUBLIC_SITE_URL and resolves to null when the request host disagrees, so previews never offer a ceremony the browser would refuse.
128 lines
4.8 KiB
TypeScript
128 lines
4.8 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Browser half of the WebAuthn ceremonies (B40). Client-safe: it only speaks
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* `fetch` to the `/campanha/webauthn/*` routes and hands the JSON to
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* `@simplewebauthn/browser`. Both islands (login button, profile card) call
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* these, so the wire shape and the platform-error mapping exist once.
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*
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* Reached only through a dynamic `import()` from a handler — the library it
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* pulls in must not ride along in the First Load JS of routes that will never
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* run a ceremony. The probe and the error type live in `campaignWebAuthnSupport`
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* for exactly that reason.
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*/
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import type {
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PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsJSON,
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PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptionsJSON,
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} from '@simplewebauthn/browser'
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import { startAuthentication, startRegistration } from '@simplewebauthn/browser'
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import {
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CAMPAIGN_BIOMETRIC_CANCELLED_MESSAGE,
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CAMPAIGN_BIOMETRIC_DUPLICATE_DEVICE_MESSAGE,
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CAMPAIGN_BIOMETRIC_UNSUPPORTED_MESSAGE,
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} from '@/lib/campaignAuthCopy'
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import {
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CAMPAIGN_WEBAUTHN_ROUTES,
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type CampaignPasskeyView,
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type CampaignWebAuthnLoginResponse,
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type CampaignWebAuthnOptionsResponse,
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type CampaignWebAuthnRegisterResponse,
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} from '@/lib/campaignWebAuthn'
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import { CampaignWebAuthnError } from '@/lib/campaignWebAuthnSupport'
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const postJson = async <Response>(path: string, body?: unknown): Promise<Response> => {
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const response = await fetch(path, {
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method: 'POST',
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headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Accept: 'application/json' },
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credentials: 'same-origin',
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body: JSON.stringify(body ?? {}),
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})
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// A 409/403/500 from these routes still carries the typed envelope, so the
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// discriminant — not the status — decides. A non-JSON error page (proxy,
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// offline) is the only case that has to be invented here.
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try {
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return (await response.json()) as Response
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} catch {
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throw new Error('Resposta inválida do servidor.')
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}
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}
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/**
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* `navigator.credentials` rejects with DOM exceptions whose names are the only
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* reliable signal; the messages are browser-authored and untranslated. Hence an
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* unrecognized name returns a plain `Error`: the islands show their own copy for
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* anything that is not a `CampaignWebAuthnError`, and the original text stays in
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* the console instead of reaching a pt-BR screen in English.
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*/
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const asCeremonyError = (error: unknown): Error => {
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const name = error instanceof Error ? error.name : ''
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// NotAllowedError covers both "user closed the sheet" and "timed out", which
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// are the same thing from where the person is standing.
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if (name === 'NotAllowedError' || name === 'AbortError') {
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return new CampaignWebAuthnError(CAMPAIGN_BIOMETRIC_CANCELLED_MESSAGE, { cancelled: true })
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}
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// InvalidStateError on create means this authenticator already holds a
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// credential we excluded — i.e. the device is enrolled already.
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if (name === 'InvalidStateError') {
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return new CampaignWebAuthnError(CAMPAIGN_BIOMETRIC_DUPLICATE_DEVICE_MESSAGE)
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}
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if (name === 'NotSupportedError' || name === 'SecurityError') {
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return new CampaignWebAuthnError(CAMPAIGN_BIOMETRIC_UNSUPPORTED_MESSAGE)
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}
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return error instanceof Error ? error : new Error('Falha desconhecida na cerimônia WebAuthn.')
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}
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const requireOptions = <Options>(payload: CampaignWebAuthnOptionsResponse<Options>): Options => {
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if (payload.status !== 'success') throw new CampaignWebAuthnError(payload.message)
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return payload.options
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}
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/** Enrolls this device. Returns the passkey so the list can render it at once. */
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export const enrollCampaignPasskey = async (deviceLabel: string): Promise<CampaignPasskeyView> => {
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const options = requireOptions(
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await postJson<CampaignWebAuthnOptionsResponse<PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptionsJSON>>(
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CAMPAIGN_WEBAUTHN_ROUTES.registerOptions,
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),
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)
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let credential
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try {
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credential = await startRegistration({ optionsJSON: options })
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} catch (error) {
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throw asCeremonyError(error)
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}
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const result = await postJson<CampaignWebAuthnRegisterResponse>(
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CAMPAIGN_WEBAUTHN_ROUTES.register,
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{ credential, deviceLabel },
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)
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if (result.status !== 'success') throw new CampaignWebAuthnError(result.message)
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return result.passkey
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}
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/** Signs in. On success the `campaign-token` cookie is already set. */
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export const signInWithCampaignPasskey = async (): Promise<string> => {
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const options = requireOptions(
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await postJson<CampaignWebAuthnOptionsResponse<PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptionsJSON>>(
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CAMPAIGN_WEBAUTHN_ROUTES.loginOptions,
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),
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)
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let credential
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try {
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credential = await startAuthentication({ optionsJSON: options })
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} catch (error) {
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throw asCeremonyError(error)
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}
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const result = await postJson<CampaignWebAuthnLoginResponse>(CAMPAIGN_WEBAUTHN_ROUTES.login, {
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credential,
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})
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if (result.status !== 'success') throw new CampaignWebAuthnError(result.message)
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return result.redirectTo
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}
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