4806c417c8
Fold duplicated campanha access, loaders, list/filter/form shells, and scripts into shared modules; reorganize utilities by domain; stabilize e2e; and document prevention-first audit workflow so the same smells cannot creep back in.
114 lines
4.8 KiB
TypeScript
114 lines
4.8 KiB
TypeScript
import type { BrowserContext, Page } from '@playwright/test'
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import { CAMPAIGN_SESSION_TTL_LONG } from '../../src/lib/campaignSessionTtl.js'
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import { CAMPAIGN_BIOMETRICS_PROMPT_DISMISSED_KEY } from '../../src/utilities/campaignBiometricsPrompt.js'
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import { expect, test } from './fixtures/campaignE2EFixtures.js'
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/**
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* Biometric login (B40) end to end, against a **virtual authenticator** driven
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* over CDP: `WebAuthn.addVirtualAuthenticator` with `transport: 'internal'` +
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* `hasUserVerification` is what makes
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* `isUserVerifyingPlatformAuthenticatorAvailable()` answer `true` and lets the
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* ceremonies complete headlessly. Without it neither island even mounts, so
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* this is the only way to cover the flow at all.
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*/
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const addVirtualAuthenticator = async (context: BrowserContext, page: Page): Promise<void> => {
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const cdp = await context.newCDPSession(page)
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await cdp.send('WebAuthn.enable')
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await cdp.send('WebAuthn.addVirtualAuthenticator', {
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options: {
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protocol: 'ctap2',
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transport: 'internal',
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hasResidentKey: true,
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hasUserVerification: true,
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// Pre-verified: the virtual authenticator cannot show a fingerprint
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// sheet, and every ceremony here requires user verification.
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isUserVerified: true,
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automaticPresenceSimulation: true,
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},
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})
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}
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/**
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* The first ceremony of the run pays for compiling two route handlers in the dev
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* server, which under load is well past the 5 s default. Generous only where the
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* wait is a compile, never as a blanket setting.
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*/
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const CEREMONY_TIMEOUT = 60_000
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/**
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* The enrollment toast would cover the profile card it is advertising. The key
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* travels as an argument rather than as a literal inside the init script, so a
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* rename cannot silently stop silencing it.
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*/
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const silenceEnrollmentToast = (context: BrowserContext) =>
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context.addInitScript((key: string) => {
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window.localStorage.setItem(key, '1')
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}, CAMPAIGN_BIOMETRICS_PROMPT_DISMISSED_KEY)
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// Step 3 signs in with a revoked passkey, and the refusal is a handled 400 that
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// the browser still logs as a failed request — declared here so the shared
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// failure guard does not read it as a bug.
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test.use({ expectedRequestFailurePaths: ['/campanha/webauthn/login'] })
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test('enrolls a passkey, signs in with it, then revokes it', async ({
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campaign,
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context,
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page,
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}) => {
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test.slow()
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const { fixtures } = campaign
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const biometricUser = await fixtures.createCampaignUser('advisor', {
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name: fixtures.value('Assessora com biometria'),
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})
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const email = biometricUser.email!
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const password = biometricUser.password
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await silenceEnrollmentToast(context)
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await addVirtualAuthenticator(context, page)
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// 1. Enrollment is authenticated: the passkey card only exists behind a
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// password login.
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await campaign.login(page, email, password)
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await page.goto('/campanha/perfil')
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await expect(page.getByText('Nenhum aparelho cadastrado ainda.')).toBeVisible()
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const deviceLabel = page.getByLabel('Nome deste aparelho')
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await expect(deviceLabel).toBeVisible()
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await deviceLabel.fill('Celular da assessora')
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await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Ativar neste aparelho' }).click()
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await expect(page.getByText('Celular da assessora')).toBeVisible({ timeout: CEREMONY_TIMEOUT })
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await expect(page.getByText('Nenhum aparelho cadastrado ainda.')).toBeHidden()
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// 2. Password-less sign-in issues the 14-day cookie — enrolling the device IS
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// the "remember me" opt-in, so there is no checkbox in this path.
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await context.clearCookies()
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await page.goto('/campanha/login')
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const biometricButton = page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Entrar com digital ou Face ID' })
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await expect(biometricButton).toBeVisible()
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const signedInAt = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)
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await biometricButton.click()
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await page.waitForURL(/\/campanha$/)
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const tokenCookie = (await context.cookies()).find((cookie) => cookie.name === 'campaign-token')
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expect(tokenCookie?.expires).toBeGreaterThan(signedInAt + CAMPAIGN_SESSION_TTL_LONG - 120)
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// 3. Revocation is the answer to "my phone is gone", so it has to work from
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// the profile and it has to actually stop the credential.
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await page.goto('/campanha/perfil')
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await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Remover Celular da assessora' }).click()
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await expect(page.getByText('Nenhum aparelho cadastrado ainda.')).toBeVisible()
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await context.clearCookies()
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await page.goto('/campanha/login')
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await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Entrar com digital ou Face ID' }).click()
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// The device still holds its private key, so the ceremony itself succeeds and
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// the refusal must come from the server not knowing the credential anymore.
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await expect(
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page.getByRole('alert').filter({ hasText: /não está mais autorizado/i }),
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).toBeVisible({ timeout: CEREMONY_TIMEOUT })
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await expect(page).toHaveURL(/\/campanha\/login/)
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})
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